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The aim of this paper is to investigate the optimal monetary policy when bubbles boost 
and burst. The monetary policy in the form of open market operation has real effects, 
that is, influences the growth in investment and the size of bubbles. The central bank 
faces a trade-off between stimulating investment and appreciating bubbles. The optimal 
policy is contingent on the state of bubbles. When bubbles arise, the central bank may 
maintain or gives up easing, depending on how it puts weight on the state of the 
bursting of bubbles, while when bubbles burst, the central bank takes an easing policy. 
The optimal policy is the same irrespective of whether foreign capital inflows are 
allowed for unless capital markets are severely restricted. 
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1. Introduction  
A widespread view is that the FRB was too late to pull up the interest rate to repress 
bubbles. For example, Taylor (2007) criticized the FRB that the target federal funds rate 
using Taylor rule should have been higher by 2 percent than the actual rate for 
2003-2007.  
The former governor of the FRB, Greenspan objected to this view by arguing that 
the central bank has no superior information to detect bubbles until bubbles burst, and 
that killing bubbles might also kill the economic boom. He further commented that a 
question is if the central bank has any useful tool of controlling bubbles. In 1999, the 
FRB raised the federal funds rate to repress dot-come bubbles, but failed.  
A great concern is what the optimal monetary policy is for the central bank when 
bubbles boost and burst. The traditional Fed view is against the role of the policy 
reacting to bubbles. For example, Bernanke and Gerlter (1999) argue that it is difficult 
for the policy to react simultaneously to bubbles and inflation. They further state that 
the policy using Taylor rule that reacts to asset prices can destabilize the economy. On 
the other hand, some argument suggests a positive role of the policy from the prospect 
of minimizing the cost of financial crisis that would occur if bubbles burst.
1
  
Does optimal monetary policy exist to control bubbles? If it exists, should it lean on 
or against bubbles? We answer this question by analyzing the model of rational bubbles, 
where bubbles can arise if the interest rate is less than the growth rate (e.g., Tirole 1985, 
and Santos and Woodford 1997).  
 Figure 1A and 1B illustrate several interest rates and the economic growth rate (in 
real terms) in the US and Japan, two countries that experienced large bubbles in the past 
decades.
2
 The choice of the appropriate interest rates is not an easy job, and we use five 
interest rates. They include the money market rate, Treasury bill rate, the deposit 
interest rate, the interest rate on long-term bonds, and the lending rate. Interestingly, all 
                                                   
1
 See for example, Adrian and Shin (2008).  
2
 The source of data is International Financial Statistics. 
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the interest rates except for the lending rate are below the economic growth rate over the 
periods of bubble episodes in both countries, 2003-2007 in the US and 1986-1991 in 
Japan. These observations are roughly consistent with the prediction of the theory of 
rational bubbles.  
We provide a model of multiple liquidities where the key ingredient of the model is 
the asset substitution among the security backed by firm’s value, bubbly liquidity, and 
liquidity backed by fundamentals. We model the monetary policy in the form of open 
market operation that indirectly changes the return on the price of fundamental-backed 
liquidity. Once bubbles arise, maintaining easing stimulates investment and at the same 
time leads to the boost in bubbles that makes the damages of the bursting excessively 
severe. Once bubbles burst, easing can lessen the magnitude of the recession. The 
optimal monetary policy is contingent on the state of bubbles.   
Contributions of this paper are as follows. First, the monetary policy in the form of 
open market operation has real effects, that is, influences the growth in investment and 
the size of bubbles. If the central bank delays giving up monetary easing, the economy 
should have excessive bubbles that would magnify the recession on the onset of the 
bursting of bubbles. On the other hand, if the central bank conducts the excessive 
monetary tightening, the boom as well as bubbles could collapse.  
Second, the optimal monetary policy is contingent on the state of bubbles. When 
bubbles arise, the central bank will tighten the stance, and when bubbles burst, it 
conducts easing. 
Third, we evaluate monetary reactions of the central bank when bubbles boost and 
burst in the US and Japan. Following theoretical findings, the central bank in the US did 
a pretty good job, but the central bank in Japan committed several mistakes.  
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Forth, the optimal policy is the same irrespective of whether foreign capital inflows 
are allowed for. Foreign capital appreciates bubbles, but does not contribute to 
stimulating domestic investment. Despite this, the optimal policy is to lean on bubbles 
unless capital markets are severely restricted. 
This paper is related to several contributions that investigate the role of store of 
values in macroeconomics, including Tirole (1985), Woodford (1990), Kiyotaki and 
Moore (1997), and Holmstrom and Tirole (1998). Distinguishable is the fact that this 
paper introduces the monetary policy into the literature, showing that the monetary 
policy has real effects in the flexible price model. 
This paper is closely related to the literature on the debate as to whether the 
government should lean on or against bubbles. Some argues that the central bank should 
not pay attention to asset prices. The literature includes Bernanke and Gertler (1999, 
2001), Bernanke (2002), Greenspan (2002), Mishkin (2008) among others. Others are in 
favor of leaning against bubbles, including Blanchard (2000), Bordo and Jeanne (2002), 
Borio and Lowe (2002), Borio and White (2003), Cecchetti, Genberg, Lipsky and 
Wadhwani (2000), Cecchetti, Genberg and Wadhwani (2002), among others. Models of 
this literature have no theoretical foundation for bubbles, and the debate hinges on the 
simple premise that (not) raising the interest rate implies leaning against (on) bubbles. 
Our policy rule is simple but more sophisticated in that it involves leaning on bubbles 
and raising the interest rate simultaneously.  
 
2. The Model 
Consider a model of rational bubbles developed by Farhi and Tirole (2012). In each 
period a unit mass of agents are born, and live for three periods. The economy lasts to 
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infinity. There is no population growth or technological progress. Individual agents are 
endowed with A  units of goods when young, and with l  units of the Lucas tree 
when old.
4
 Each of the date-t trees pays one unit of good as dividend at data t+1. Their 
preference is risk neutral in consumption when old. Each generation is indexed by the 
period in which it is middle-aged.  
As owners of the firm, middle-aged agents have access to one linear investment 
opportunity that transforms one unit of good into fR (>1) units of good after one period. 
To motivate financial market imperfections, we assume that only part of the return,
)( fRR  , is pledgeable to creditors. Debtors are protected by their limited liability. 
Assume that 5.0R which is necessary for the existence of the bubbly economy that 
satisfies the binding borrowing constraint, as will be obvious below. 
We model monetary policy as controlling the return on trees. As argued later, 
changing the price of trees requires the market operation by the central bank to affect 
the market condition. As will be clear below, a tree is fundamental-backed liquidity that 
competes with bubbly liquidity and the security issued by firms in the investors’ 
portfolio. Thus monetary policy is aimed to influence asset substitution through the 
change in the price of fundamental-backed liquidity. This specification of the monetary 
policy captures reducing costs of finance for firms, and asset allocation between 
liquidities, but is not conventional in that it does not capture the cost and benefit of 
holding fiat money.  
Suppose that bubbles burst with probability 0 . Investors act as if bubbles do 
not burst, but the government takes a weight )0(1  on the state of bubbles that 
                                                   
4
 An alternative specification is, as in Farhi and Tirole, to assume another type of agents who 




occurs with a probability of measure zero, and behaves as if it believes that bubbles 
burst with probability 1 . Once bubbles burst, the economy returns to the bubbleless 
economy forever. Investors in periods of bubbles are very often in the state of euphoria 
and overconfident in the valuation of assets.
5
 The government is supposed to be 
relatively indifferent to the boom but more risk averse to the downward risk of the 
bursting of bubbles than investors because financial crisis or the increase in the 
unemployment triggered by the bursting becomes the reason for the alternation of 
power.    
 
3. Analysis  
The wealth of young agents is used to purchase three assets, securities issued by the 
previous generation to run the firm, trees, and bubbles. The demand for securities is 
limited to the present value of the pledgeable asset )1(1 tt rRi   when 1ti  is invested 
by the firm of the date t-1 generation. The demand for trees is equal to the presented 

















Middle-aged agents finance investment by the internal wealth and issuing securities. 














Bubbles evolve as  
(3)  ttt brb )1( 11   . 
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 See for example Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) and Hong et al (2006). 
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We define the competitive equilibrium of a bubbly economy that satisfies the binding 
borrowing constraint, as a sequence 
0},,{ tttt rbi  
that satisfies (1), (2), and (3).  
Before introducing bubbles into the model, we study the competitive equilibrium of 
a bubbleless economy that satisfies the binding borrowing constraint. The steady state is 



















Proposition 1: The competitive equilibrium of a bubbleless economy that satisfies the 
binding borrowing constraint is dynamically stable.  








 1)1()( . The RHS is positive and increasing for 01 ti , while 
the LHS satisfies 0)()0(  i  and is increasing and convex for 0 RlAiit , 
and for 0i  satisfies 0)0(   and is increasing and convex for 0ti . There exists 
the unique steady state 
Di >0 that satisfies lRii
DD  )( . For Dt ii 1 , 
)()( 11   ttt ilRii , and ti  is increasing, while for 
D
t ii 1 , 
)()( 11   ttt ilRii , and ti  is decreasing. Investment is stable. Q.E.D. 
 
Monetary policy 
The central bank controls the return on trees through market operation. At date t the  
central bank buys )10( l  units of trees at price Ltr 11   by using the revenue 
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raised from taxing old consumers. At period t+1 the dividend is transferred to old 
consumers. In this environment, young investors purchase l)1(   units of trees. 













































  at the steady state. The function )( Lri  is 
defined over ],[ Drr , and increasing for RrL 21  , and decreasing for Rr L 21  , 
where Dr  corresponds to 0  and r  corresponds to 1 .  
 
Proposition 2: The monetary easing stimulates investment for Rr L 21  , and 
represses investment for Rr L 21  .  
 
We define the objective function of the central bank that decides the monetary stance. 
The welfare of the date-t generation is composed of the profit from investment 
t
f iRR )(  and the revenue from selling trees )1( 1 trl , and the transfer net of taxation 
)1( 1 trll  . The central bank evaluates the welfare of all generations with a social 






























































focus on the case when agents are better off by investing more. We impose the 
following assumption to guarantee that (.)
DV  is strictly increasing. 
 
Assumption 1  
fR  is sufficiently high and l  is sufficiently small.   
 
Proposition 3: Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. In the bubbleless economy, the 
central bank conducts monetary easing by purchasing trees at the maximum size ( 1 ) 
if 1Dr , while the central bank does not conduct monetary easing if 1Dr .  
Proof: Under the assumption of R<0.5, 12)1(  RRR  and we have
)1()1()( RRiri  . Since investment realizes the minimum at R2  over ]1,1[ Drr  , 
investment is maximized at )1(1 Drr   if 1)(Dr . Q.E.D. 
 
Bubbly Equilibrium  
We turn to the competitive equilibrium of a bubbly economy that satisfies the binding 

















, and 0Br . 
Note that investment is positive and finite only if R<1. Bubbles are positively valued if 










which also implies that the interest rate is less than the growth rate, zero in this model. 
Thus in Proposition 3, the case for 1Dr  is eliminated when (#1) holds.  
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Equation (5) states that when bubbles arise, investment is independent of the 
market evaluation of trees l , but bubbles are negatively related to them.  
 
Proposition 4: Suppose that Condition (#1) holds. Given 01 ti , there exists 
maximum feasible bubbles )( 1tib , for which the competitive equilibrium converges to 
the bubbly steady state that satisfies the binding borrowing constraint. On the 
convergent path to the steady state, investment is monotone increasing (decreasing) and 
bubbles are monotone decreasing (increasing) for 
B
t ii 1 )( 1
B
t ii  . 
Proof: See Farhi and Tirole (2012). 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the phase diagram of the dynamics of the bubbly economy. There 
exist a unique stable manifold )(1 tt ib  that approaches monotonically the bubbly 
steady state. 
 
Proposition 5: Suppose that Condition (#1) holds. Bubbles crowd investment in , that is, 
BD ii   when 0l . 










llAiR . which has two solutions. When 0l , one of 
these solutions is negative, and the other is positive. Letting )(i  denote the LHS, 
)(i  is increasing around the positive solution 0










iB  under (#1). We find 




Bubbles crowd investment in. When bubbles arise, the released resource from saving 
trees stimulates investment. There are three liquidities. The security issued by firms and 
trees are inside liquidity, and bubbles are outside liquidity.  
 
A central question is if the central bank keeps or gives up monetary easing once 
bubbles arise. The central bank is more conservative than people on the riskiness of 

























D iWiWiW   
The first line represents the welfare given that bubbles persist, and the second line given 
that bubbles burst. The function )( 1
c
t
D iW   is the value function if the bursting of 
bubbles at date t+1represses investment at 
c
ti 1 . Then investment converges 
monotonically to Di  and )( 1
c
t
D iW   is increasing. As for the first line, we have the 
following. 
 
Result 1: Suppose that Assumption 1 and (#1) hold. Then the welfare of the date-t 
generation, )1()( 1 tt
f rliRR , is increasing in ti . 











 , where we use the fact the 
equilibrium satisfies the stable manifold )(1 tt ib  , with )(i being continuous and 
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0 lARRR f . The final inequality comes from Assumption 1. Q.E.D. 
 
Three policy regimes that we compare are monetary easing, benign neglect, and 
tightening. We first compare between easing and benign neglect . The central bank 
conducts easing by buying trees, with 0 . The steady state equilibrium under easing 
















 .  

















The difference lies in the size of bubbles, not in the magnitude of investment. We have 
to analyze the properties of the equilibrium out of the steady state in order to evaluate 
welfare.  
 
Proposition 6: Maximum easing ( 1 ) realizes the fastest growth in investment, given 
the same investment level. 













lARii  . Bubbles are 
monotone decreasing and thus 11 1  tr  for 
B
t ii 1 , and then the interest rate is less 
than zero, and thus the last term is maximized when 1 . Investment is the highest 




Result 2: The sum of bubbly and non-bubbly liquidities is greater as the central bank 
conducts easing (as   is higher ), given the same investment level.  
Proof: Without loss of generality, we compare between two cases, 0  and 1 . 
We prove this in two steps. First we prove that, letting )'( tt bb  denote bubbles in the 
tree (no-tree) regime, lbb tt '  for any 
B
t ii 1 . Second, we prove that ti  is 
decreasing in tb'  for any given 
B
t ii 1 .  
In order to prove the first step, we prove that the manifold under the no-tree regime 
should be above )(1 tt ib   more than by l  for any given 
B
t ii  . We introduce the 
hypothetical manifold that is proportional shift of )(1 tt ib   by l , satisfying 
)(1 lib tt  , and goes through A and B. If the real manifold is above it for 
B
t ii 1 , 
any point on the path should traverse across the manifold from above. Suppose that, 
starting from the same 1Ti , the manifold )( ti  dictates Tb , while )( lit   dictates



















lbb TT   11' , we have 11  tt bb  since tb  is decreasing for 
B
t ii 1
(Proposition 4). As Figure 3 illustrates, A goes to C, which should lie below )( lit  . 
Therefore, the manifold should be should be above )(1 tt ib   more than by l  for 
any given 
B
t ii  . Comparing between two manifolds, we find  lbb tt '  for any 
B
t ii 1 .  
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  . 
For R<1, we obtain 0'  tt bi  given 1ti . Q.E.D.  
 
Figure 3 illustrates the saddle path of the economy with trees, )(1 tt ib  , and the one 
without it, )(1 t
n
t ib  . In transition, bubbles under easing are more than the sum of 
bubbles and the valuation of trees l  under no intervention. The abundant bubbles 
contribute to enhancing investment.  
Starting from the same initial condition, easing realizes the higher investment than no 
intervention at any point in time. Result 1 and Proposition 6 jointly states that easing 
realizes the higher first term than no intervention.  
We turn to the second line. Suppose that bubbles burst at T when 1 T
D ii . The 






























which are the same as the bubbleless competitive equilibrium. The economy converges 
monotonically to 





D iiii . Note that  Di depends on the 









































This economy also converges to 
Di , satisfying 1
,,





D iiii . The difference 
between the two lies in (7) and (9). The term of l  disappears from (9), reflecting that 
agents that had only bubbles as liquidity lose more internal wealth than when they had 
both bubbles and trees. Easing boost more bubbles, and thus depresses investment more 






 for any given 1Ti . 
 
Proposition 7: Once bubbles burst given the same investment, easing runs the larger 
repression of investment than no intervention.  
 
Starting from the same investment, before bubbles burst, easing realizes the higher 
investment at any point in time (Proposition 6), while once bubbles burst, easing 
depresses investment more severely. Which policy realizes the higher welfare is in 
general ambiguous, depending on to what degree the government takes weight on the 
bursting of bubbles. If λis small, the central bank chooses monetary easing, but if λ 
is high, the central bank tends to choose to give up easing.  
We turn to compare between bursting and bursting of bubbles. We specify 
tightening as keeping the return on trees with 0Lr .
6
 Then investors would hold trees 
                                                   
6
 In the bubbly economy, market operation cannot effectively affect the interest rate in the long 
run, and we have to alternative policy tool to tightening the stance. One way is to issue 
one-period public debt that matures at the next period, and make the condition for the existence 
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first, and next bubbles. The interest rate would be raised up to 111 1  
L
t rr , which 
makes it impossible to support bubbles. When bubbles occurs given 
Di , bursting 
bubbles makes the economy back to 
Di . On the other hand, if the central bank chooses 
not bursting, investment evolves over ),(




















iRR  for date-t agents. Since ti  ranges over ),(
BD ii  and 1tr ranges 
over )0,(
Dr , the first term of the welfare is high when not bursting and the second term 
is high when bursting. Increasing fR  can make the welfare when not bursting 
arbitrarily higher than the former. Additionally, when λ is high, bubbles are less 
likely to burst, and then investment is on average high. When  fR  andλ are high, the 
welfare when not bursting tends to be higher than the one when bursting. The 
government chooses not bursting. We impose the following assumption. 
 
Assumption 2  fR  andλ are sufficiently high.  
 
Proposition 8: Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Once bubbles arise, the central 
bank chooses to lean on bubbles, and conducts neither monetary easing nor tightening.  
 
The central bank pursues the narrow road to keep the boom (crowding-in) and stability 
(small bubbles). If the central bank delays stopping the monetary easing, the economy 
                                                                                                                                                     









bubbles are unsustainable in the long run, and have to burst. 
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should have excessive bubbles that would magnify the recession on the onset of the 
bursting of bubbles. On the other hand, if the central bank tightens the monetary stance 
excessively, the central bank could collapse the boom as well as bubbles.  
We finally argue on the monetary stance once bubbles burst. Obviously the optimal 
policy is the same as the one before bubbles arise.  
 
Proposition 9: Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Once bubbles burst, the central bank 
conducts monetary easing by controlling the return on trees at r1 . 
 
Is public debt a perfect substitute of bubbles? 
In an environment where bubbles arise, public debt can be a form of outside liquidity.  
Suppose that the government issues one-period bonds that are claims on the next 
period’s tax proceed d  levied on old agents. Each of d  units of bonds yields one unit 
at maturity and sells at )1(1 1 tr .  


































, and 0Br . 










By issuing debt and redeeming it by taxation old agents, the government is able to 
increase the supply of outside liquidity and induces bubbly liquidity to decrease. 
Actually, as long as 11 1  tr , the government can issue debt and roll it over without 
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raising taxation. The government has to tax )1( 1 trd , but issues debt d . 
Interestingly, government debt is more than a perfect substitute of bubbles when it is 
backed by taxation. Government debt plays a role of enhancing growth in investment 
(Proposition 6), and of weakening the cost of the bursting of bubbles (Proposition 7).  
When bubbles arise, the government should not advance the fiscal restoration for 
retiring debt.  
 
Capital inflows and monetary stance    
As Greenspan tells from the unsuccessful experience in 1999, whether tightening 
monetary stance can effectively repress bubbles is a question. We provide one 
mechanism where monetary tightening rather appreciates bubbles by using the story of 
capital inflows.  
In doing so, assume another country where agents, with a unit mass, are born every 
period, and live for two periods. Individual agents are endowed with fA  units when 
young, and consume when old. Between periods, they have access to one linear 
investment opportunity that transforms their wealth fA  into )1( ff rA  , where we 
assume 111  frr . The former inequality says that agents find it beneficial to 
invest their wealth domestically in the absence of bubbles, and the latter inequality says 
that agents find it beneficial to invest their wealth abroad when bubbles arise.  
Given this modification, the asset demand function includes foreign as well as 

















On the other hand, the asset supply function is given by 
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, and 0Br . 









Capital inflows appreciate bubbles but do not stimulate investment. Foreign capital does 
not contribute to enhancing internal wealth of domestic firms, and so investment does 
not change.  
In this environment it is interesting to study the optimal monetary policy. A primary 
concern is whether the central bank can prevent foreign capital from flowing in by 
maintaining monetary easing. In order to obtain meaningful implications, we restrict the 
behavior of foreign investors in two ways. Suppose first that foreign agents believe that 
bubbles burst with probability one so that they do not hold bubbles, and secondly that 
part of the return, )(' RR  , is pledgeable to foreigners.  
In this environment, the effectiveness of monetary easing on preventing capital inflows 
depends on whether foreign investors can invest in firms. Firms have an incentive to 
issue securities to foreigners only if the maximum leverage when securities are issued to 
them )}1('1{1
frR  is higher than the leverage when issued to domestic investors 
)}1(1{1 1 trR . If RrR
f  )1(' , the central bank can effectively prevent capital 















, and 0Br . 
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Note that the equilibrium is the same as the no-tree equilibrium.  
 
Proposition 10: (a) Suppose that Assumptions 1, 2, and RrR f  )1('  hold. The 
central bank conducts monetary easing by controlling the return on trees at 
fL rr  11 in the bubbly economy if and only if lA
f  .  
(b) Suppose that Assumptions 1, 2, and RrR f  )1('  hold. The central bank 
conducts conduct neither monetary easing nor tightening in the bubbly economy.  
 
Only if foreigners’ access to capital markets is severely constrained, the central bank has 
a room for trading off repressing foreign bubbles against stimulating domestic bubbles. 
Otherwise, the central bank is better off by raising the interest rate and accept foreign 
bubbles. If the central bank keeps monetary easing, the resource released from 
fundamental-backed liquidity as well as capital inflows would exacerbate bubbles. Then 
the optimal policy is the same irrespective of capital inflows.  
A difficulty arises because then domestic investors hold all bubbles. Suppose that 
bubbles burst at T when 1 T
D ii . The asset supply function is then described as  
























When there is heterogeneity in belief in bubbles, the size of bubbles directly affects the 
cost of the bursting of bubbles. Larger bubbles that arise from foreign capital inflows 
repress investment of the domestic country more strongly.  
 
4. Some Evidence on Bubbles 
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 This analysis suggests the following optimal interest rate policy when bubbles 
boost and burst. When bubbles arise, the central bank raises the interest rate as quickly 
as possible to be close to the growth rate of the nominal GDP, and when bubbles burst, 
pulls down the interest rate as quickly as possible at less than the declining growth rate. 
This policy rule is different from the Taylor’s rule, where the nominal interest rate 
reacts to the inflation rate. This difference in the policy rule comes from the fact that 
Taylor rule is intended to work in the economy where the interest rate is higher than the 
growth rate, but our rule targets the bubbly economy where the interest rate is less than 
the growth rate. We evaluate monetary policies of the US and Japan from this 
perspective.  
 
We first have to decide the interval of the bubbly economy. Figure 4A illustrates net 
assets as a fraction of GDP in the US.
7
 The economy is supposed to be stable along the 
balanced growth path in the ordinal state without bubbles.
8
 Actually, this ratio is stable 
at five and around except for 1998-2008 when the IT dot-com bubbles started and 
housing bubbles ended. In national income accounts, the stock data accounts for capital 
gains (losses) of assets, but the flow data does not. This ratio tends to increase in the 
period of bubble episode when assets grow faster than GDP, and is supposed to 
represent a good indicator of bubbles. This figure increased persistently from 2003Q1, 
and peaks out at 6.3 in 2007Q1.  
                                                   
7
 The source of data is the flow of funds accounts of the US (FRB’s). Net worth is defined as 
total assets less total liabilities of three sectors, households and nonprofit organizations, 
nonfarm nonfinancial corporate business, and nonfarm nonfinancial noncorporate business. 
Total assets include tangible assets and financial assets. Note that tangible assets include real 
estate at market value.  
8
 Lettau and Ludvigson (2004) investigate the consumption-wealth link using US time-series 
data, finding that the majority of fluctuations in asset values are attributable to transitory 
innovations that display virtually no association with consumption. 
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Figure 4B illustrates net assets as a fraction of GDP in Japan.
9
 The ratio started to 
increase since 1986, and peaks out at 8 in 1990, and except for that interval it is stable 
around 5.5. We could safely judge that the periods for bubbles are 2003Q1-2007Q1 in 
the US and 1986-1990 in Japan. The behavior of interest rates and the growth rate that 
are illustrated in Figures 1A and 1B also supports this judgment. 
If the size of bubbles at peak is measured in terms of GDP, it is about 1.3 times 
GDP in the US, whereas it is 2.4 times in Japan. Real estate assets relative to GDP rose 
by 0.9 from 2002 to 2007 in the US, while they rose by 2.5 from 1986 to 1990 in Japan, 
suggesting that housing and land bubbles were significant components of bubbles.  
Figure 5A illustrates the central bank’s reaction of the federal funds rate to the 
nominal GDP growth rate in the US. The FRB raised the federal funds rate from the 
bottom of 1.0 percent in 2004Q2 to an eventual level of 5.25 percent over 2006Q3 to 
catch up with the growth rate. Since bubbles started in 2003Q1, the FRB was late one 
year to react. Looking at the figure, if the speed for catching up is sufficiently quick is a 
question. The slowly rising interest rate may have contributed to stimulating bubbles. 
Once bubbles burst in 2007Q1, the FRB reacted quickly and lowered the federal funds 
rate to be less than the growth rate. The FRB was doing a pretty good job.  
Figure 5B illustrates the reaction in Japan. There are two policy mistakes from the 
optimal policy. First, the Bank of Japan (BOJ) was so late to raise the interest rate 
(uncollateralized overnight call rate). Since bubbles started in 1986, it took almost two 
year and a half to start raising the interest rate. However, once the central bank started 
tightening, it raised the interest rate too quickly, which may have contributed to bursting 
bubbles. Finally, once bubbles burst, the BOJ was too late to cut the interest rate. It was 
                                                   
9
 In Japan the source of the data is the National Income Accounts (Cabinet Office). Net worth is 
available from “Closing Stocks of Assets/Liabilities for the Nation” in “Supporting Tables”. 
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not until 1995 when the interest rate is less than the growth rate. The BOJ was doing a 
poor job ! The differential reaction of the monetary authorities may be one source of 
different size of bubbles across countries.  
It is interesting to evaluate the effects of target federal funds rate using Taylor rule, 
which should have been higher by 2 percent than the actual rate for 2003-2007 (e.g., 
Taylor, 2007). There are two important features. The simple application of the 
aggregate Taylor rule might have contributed to repressing bubbles for 2003-2007. On 
the other hand, it raises the interest rate too much beyond the growth rate, suggesting 
that it might have made the impacts of the bursting bubbles more serious.  
We next provide some evidence where raising the federal funds rate called for 
capital inflows that are supposed to have contributed to the US bubbles. The US-Japan 
capital flows are a good example. Hattori and Shin (2008) highlight the role of yen 
carry trade, where the interbank lending between the Japanese branch of the US banks 
and headquarter is closely related to the deleveraging of the US financial sector. We 
show that yen carry trade occurred more systematically through the interbank lending.    
In March 2001, the BOJ started a quantitative easing policy by maintaining the 
uncollateralized overnight call rate at the bank at near zero percent (Zero-Interest Rate 
Policy), and continued this policy until July 2006. 
Following the bursting of dot-com bubbles, the U.S. Federal Reserve Board 
lowered the federal funds rate from 6.5 at maximum in January 2001, gradually to 1.0 
percent in June 2003. However, in June 2004, following the boost of housing bubbles, 
the FRB turned to rate hiking. The FRB raised the federal funds rates from the bottom 
of 1.0 percent to an eventual level of 5.25 percent in 2006.  
24 
 
The change in the monetary policy stance in 2004 predicts differentials in both 
short-term and long-terms interest rates between U.S. and Japan.  
Figure 6 describes interest rate differentials of assets with different maturities, 2, 5, 
10, and 20 years.
10
 The differential in the 2-year rate sharply widened in 2004, which 
also affected the middle-term, 5-year rate differential expanding. Those differentials 
continued to widening until 2005-2006. On the other hand, the differentials in 10- and 
20-year rates do not have an upward trend. This is the situation where the longer-term 
yields did not rise regardless of the Fed’s rate hikes, Greenspan called ‘conundrum’.  
Figure 7 describes the behavior of exchange rate of yen /dollar.
11
 Until the last of 
2003, the Japanese yen appreciated, but since the first of 2004 when the FRB changed 
the monetary stance, it started depreciating. The time-series behavior for the exchange 
rate is consistent with the prediction of capital flow theory, where capital flew from 
Japan with low interest rates to US with high interest rates.  
Figure 8 shows the behavior of the annual net capital flow, based on the net balance 
of capital and financial accounts.
12
 The solid line depicts the net capital flow that 
corresponds to the current account deficit. Capital flew out from Japan to foreign 
countries except for 2003, and did strongly from 2005 to 2008 when the US economy 
was booming. The current account deficit was the highest in 2007, about 4 percent in 
terms of GDP. 
This figure also depicts net investments by type. Among them, what exhibits a 
remarkable behavior is the “other investment”. Other investment that is distinguished 
from portfolio investment and FDI includes loans, trade credits, and transfer of other 
                                                   
10
 The source of data is Bloomberg.  
11
 The source of data is Bloomberg.  
12
 The source of data is "Balance of Payments"(Bank of Japan).  
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currency and deposits. They also include the repo transaction, the short-term borrowing 
that takes the form of the repurchase agreement of safe assets, such as JGB. In addition, 
these loans include the inter-office account of Japanese banks, that is, in-house loans 
from domestic headquarters to overseas branches, and the inter-office account of foreign 
banks, in-house loans from Japanese branches to overseas headquarters. 
The net flow of other investment” was inward from 2001 to 2004, but turned 
outward from 2005 to 2007. Short-term loans mainly contributed to such large outflow. 
In addition, while in 2001-2002 there were a large amount of loans in inter-office 
accounts of Japanese banks, since 2004 loans other than that increased. Such loans, 
including repo, are mainly made at the short term, and are supposed to be used for 
purchasing longer-term assets through leveraged financing. 
Figure 9 describes the chart for fund flows.
13
 Over 2004-2008, loans supplied by 
headquarters of domestic banks to their overseas branches account for 9 trillion yen. 
Loans supplied by Japanese branches of foreign banks to their overseas headquarters 
and branches account for 1.9 trillion yen. In addition, foreigners’ short-term borrowings 
such as repo from banks and securities houses account for 16.6 trillion yen. The fund 
flow channeled to the US security investment over 2004-2008 at least accounts for 27.5 
trillion yen.   
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Figure 5A: Monetary Stance in the US 






























































































































































































Figure 5B: Monetary stance in Japan 




























































































































Figure 6. US and Japan Government Bond 
Yield Differences 






































































































































































Figure 8. Capital and Financial Account 
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